7. Religion.

The sedentary population of Turkestan as well as the Kazakhs profess themselves to be Sunnite Moslems. But whereas the Kazakhs are really Moslems only in name, the sedentary people, especially the sedentary Uzbeks, have been marked from the beginning by great fanaticism, and probably in this connection they deserve first place among all the followers of Islam. This fanaticism was nurtured primarily by the so-called 'rais' 'duvanas' and 'ishans', of which the first have at present been abolished in the Russian possessions. The 'rais' were officials appointed by the government, whose chief task was to supervise the strict fulfillment of the precepts of the Koran, and to punish those who were indifferent or unconcerned. They were equipped for this purpose with a whip made of a wide, thick leather thong, and a wooden handle, with which they drove together to prayers those who systematically avoided the visits to the mosques. In addition, they mercilessly whipped the tradespeople in the bazaars who were guilty of profiting at the expense of the public through false measures or weights. Also the management of the control of prostitutes was transferred to the rais, and those evildoers caught 'in flagrante' were punished in a truly barbaric fashion. Since the rais were just as corruptible as the other officials, as a rule they called only those people to account who did not have the means to buy themselves off, so that the official activity of the rais appeared to be more of a well organized system of extortion. Since the Russians naturally had no particular interest in nurturing the fanaticism of the population of their Central Asian possessions, which was directed against all those of other creeds, they abolished the office of the rais in the areas under their domination, and they exist at the present time only in the khanates which are still independent.

/196/ The 'duvanas' are, in Turkestan, what the dervishes or 'kalantars' are in other Moslem lands. The duvanas usually live in a cloistered community and are celibates, although there are also married duvanas. Their number is rather large; at every bazaar and at every fair one meets whole crowds of singing, screeching duvanas, who assess the public for contributions. Their influence and the respect which they enjoy among the people is very great, which has always remained a mystery to me, for one can scarcely imagine a more vulgar, impudent, and repulsive throng than the duvanas. They

741 In the Russian dominions of Central Asia the management of the wakf possessions has been taken over by the Russian authorities, but they use the income in the traditional manner for religious purposes. /Figure 72, p. 41a. Caption: Maxim mosque in Tashkent./

771 788 In spite of the willingness which the Central Asian Moslems disclose everywhere to make sacrifices for religious ends, their religiosity really lies only in externals; in the giving of alms, and in the strictest possible observance of all the other external religious practices prescribed by the Koran, exactly as it once was with the Jewish Pharisees. They perform their endless ablutions precisely before each prayer, before each prayer, before and after every meal, after every natural function of the body, if necessary even in the middle of the street, and I have never seen a Moslem omit his morning or evening prayer. Even on a journey in the worst weather and the most terrible mud they kneel in the middle of the road and say their prayer at sunrise /202/ and sunset without taking any notice of anything. Even when they are in the midst of the most heated battle, when the hour of prayer is proclaimed they cease hostilities at once, only to start up again with renewed strength after the prayers are over. But at the same time, this is all there is to it. They consider it completely irrelevant that along with this they allow themselves every kind of betrayal and cheating of their fellowman, especially if he is of another faith or a Kafir, and indulge in secret in the most wicked vices and debauchery as long as the decorum is maintained and nothing is brought out into the open.

796 The Moslems have no regularly recurring holidays like our Sundays. They have only three great festivals a year, each of which is celebrated for several days; otherwise, however, every day is like any other. Only on Fridays the men gather in the morning at the mosque for the group prayer, but afterwards they go about their work and their business as on every other weekday.

368 576 The mosques are not regarded as houses of God, as they are by the Christians, but are no more than places of assembly. Therefore the Moslems do not find it strange to have their mosques visited by non-believers. On my journeys in Bukhara, which is very orthodox, mosques were assigned to me as the preferred place for me to live in during the length of my stay, if no better place were forthcoming. Also the fact that the Moslems remove their shoes before entering a mosque has no religious basis, but is based on the universal custom, conditioned by the regard for cleanliness, of removing the outer foot-

well-known slips of paper of Passau, which were supposed to make the owner invulnerable, but which actually contained no more than the sentence "Scoundrel, defend yourself!" These amulets can be purchased for precious /207/ gold, mostly from the apothecaries and the Jews, who are especially competent in such things, and are usually in a small three-cornered bag, or in a cylinder of thin silver or cardboard and the like (Figure 76, p. 208) worn on a cord around the neck or over the shoulder. /Figure 75. Caption: The Tombstone of Tamerlane and his family in Samarkand (The dark, disfigured stone in the middle is Tamerlane's tombstone.)/ Even /208/ the domestic animals, especially the horses are hung with amulets in order to protect them from bad luck and sickness. The Moslems of Turkestan, especially the Tadjiks, often show particular veneration for certain holy trees. These are, as a rule, ancient trees, standing in isolation, which are ostensibly planted by some saint and their shade is naturally very much desired by weary travelers. The travelers manifest their veneration for these holy trees by cutting off rags from their clothes and tying them to the twigs. The appearance of the trees decorated in this fashion naturally leaves something to be desired, particularly if the rags attached are as numerous as the leaves, as is often the case. This tree cult is obviously still another survival from Indo-European antiquity. It is known that Xerxes on his journey to Greece gave gifts to a tree under the shade of which he had rested, hanging on its twigs golden chains and clasps. It is likewise known how much veneration the ancient Teutons showed for their holy trees, so much so that the Christian missionaries found themselves induced to cut these trees down in order to accelerate the conversion of the Teutons. The May trees and Christmas trees still used among the Germans today probably go back in like manner to an earlier tree cult.
/Figure 76. Caption: Amulet Holders./

The Central Asian Moslems were unusually fanatical before the Russian domination, as we have already mentioned, and there was great anxiety on the part of the /209/ Russians at first as to how they would live peaceably with such fanatics. As it turned out later, however, this fanaticism was only the work of a few interested circles, those of the rais, the duvanas, the ishans and the mullahs, who held the common people in their grip. Since the power of these professional fanatics has been broken in the Russian dominions in that they are no longer supported from above, and the people are left to themselves, it has turned out that the people's fanaticism is not nearly of so much

771 importance, and that their own profit and amusement lies much closer
659 to their hearts than the zeal of their mullahs. The Russian regime grants the Moslems absolute religious freedom, and General von Kauffmann has, in this connection, from the very beginning prohibited any sort of missionary activity and all proselytizing by Orthodox priests as well as missionaries of the other Christian faiths. He has even prevented the choice of Tashkent as the seat of the bishop of Turkestan in the interests of avoiding all possible friction between Moslems and Christians. Instead he relegated to Vernoye, /Alma Ata/ the capital of the province of Semirechiye, the population of which is almost exclusively Russian and Orthodox. Naturally General von Kauffmann is blamed for all this by the Orthodox clergy; the result has shown, however, how correctly he calculated. The tolerance exercised by the Russians toward the Moslems has not only not strengthened Islam in the Russian dominions of Central Asia, but on the contrary it has resulted in a striking indifference on the part of its followers, which one would not have believed possible among Moslems. During the entire fifteen years of my stay in Turkestan, not a single conflict between Moslems and Christian was acknowledged such as those often forthcoming in an India made insecure by English missionaries. Moslems and Christians get on as well with each other in Turkestan today, as one could wish from different Christian sects side by side. The Moslem dignitaries and men of rank take part spontaneously in church burials of Russian officials, and at the time of the last illness of General von Kauffmann, who was universally respected by the natives, the Moslem mullahs asked permission to pray for his recovery in the palace of the Governor General in company with the Russian priests.

8. The Administration of Justice.

671 The legal views of the sedentary population of Turkestan and those of the Kazakhs and other nomads are diametrically opposed; the former are much closer to our concepts of right and wrong. While the Kazakhs, as we have seen above, /in section not translated/ have views similar to the ancient Spartans and Teutons regarding mine and thine /210/ and recognize no difference between the civil and criminal nature of a crime, among the sedentary population theft is very strictly punished and a precise distinction is made between an offense which only involves harm to a fellow creature, and one directed at the social order. Actual written laws do not exist in the Central Asian

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This conclusion of course requires qualification in the case of the relatively few sedentary and town populations speaking only a Turkic language: in that case language is not a safe criterion, for these 'Turks' may be, and often are, turkized Tajiks. History shows many instances of other peoples adopting Turkish ways, but until recently very few of the adoption by Turks of the dress of other civilizations.[1] Many more of the town-dwellers are bilingual in Uzbek and Tajik; in their case this bilingualism points even more strongly to the Tajik or mixed origin of the individuals concerned. It was to sedentary dwellers of this kind, whether bilingual or speaking only Tajik, that the true Turks formerly applied the pejorative appellation of 'Sart'.

At the same time, the Iranization of the Turkic tongues in the southern cities is an illustration of the mingling of the raindrops of which I have spoken.[1] Lastly, the bilingualism of the oasis-strip from Khojent to Bukhara identifies specific points at which the Turkish flood passed on to leave Iranian islands unswamped by the inundations from the steppe and the mountains.

Behind all the parade of ethnology and linguistics it is well to look always for the essential difference between the settled cultivators and townsmen of the scattered oases of Transoxiana and the nomads of the northern and the western steppe (now the Kazak and Turkmen country). That is the indispensable fact, without which no insight can be obtained into the tangle of events passing for history in Central Asia. It is the old antithesis of Cain and Abel, so clear to eastern thought, a distinction always before the local leaders, on whose minds it was indelibly impressed by the events of the Basmachi struggle of 1918–24. We shall see in the subsequent analysis of periods that the settled population, whatever its ethnic origin, was for centuries exposed to Persian influence and immigration from the south, and was indeed for the first three hundred years after the Muslim conquest actually controlled by Persian rulers. One result of this contact was an indoctrination with the

[1] A notable exception is the Indianization of the Turks who followed Babur to India, due partly to the conscious policy of his grandson Akbar, but mainly to the small infusion of Turkish blood into India's vast body.

[1 [for metaphor, see cat. 116, pp 31-- Analyst]

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orthodox tenets of the most rigid form of Hanafi Sunniism — for the Samanids and others who controlled this country from the south were orthodox, and long centuries had yet to elapse before the rulers of Persia took to Shiism as the Persian State religion under the influence of Shah Ismail, founder of the Safavid dynasty of Persia in the XVIth century. A sedentary oasis population is peculiarly prone to the excesses of a morose clericalism, such as flourished in Transoxiana at least as long as the early part of the present century. On the other hand, the nomads of the steppe — the successors of the Mongol *ulus* or hordes, themselves not Islamized for the best part of a century after Chingiz Khan — naturally sit lightly to established orthodoxy or indeed to congregational worship of any kind. It is easy to simplify and the margins are blurred, but it is true in the broad to say that one of the essential differences of Persian and Turk is visible in the attitude of each to religion — an excessive formalism susceptible to the fanatical appeal, set against an easy nonchalance which may indeed recognize the immanence of God, but sees him more clearly upon the mountain than within the mosque.

But the nomad's influence on events in Central Asia, and beyond Central Asia, is not attributable only to his attitude to the things of the spirit. It is in fact he who (until the Russian coming) supplied the driving force which altered the course of history right across Asia and into Europe. As the analysis proceeds through the list of dynasties who from time to time held sway over the settled regions, we shall observe, without finding it easy to explain, the sudden emergence at more or less regular intervals of hosts which march out of the sunrise on the steppe, ruthless and disciplined, and in a few years sweep away the carefully gathered fruits of the sedentary peoples. Who are these nomads? What is the meaning of this outer nomadism? And what have they left behind in the way of flotsam and jetsam after the day of their glory has passed? And, lastly, how far have the nomadic and the settled peoples become intermingled in the course of the movements of the centuries?

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In so far as they are political and worldly we have already tried to study them, but in their deeper aspect they can only be spiritual. The leaders of the Eastern Turk nationalists were not priests' men, and were never tired of referring to the venality of the Bukharan clergy on the one hand and on the other to their fanatical devotion to an effete clericalism. A barren and rigid clericalism is indeed a phenomenon all too apparent on stages not far removed from Turkistan. Lahore, Peshawar, Kabul and Teheran can each supply recent examples. There too the fanatic has his day. But there too it is not he who best interprets the Kingdom of God on earth as seen in the light of the inspirations of Islam.

There are two strains in the spiritual inheritance of Turkistan, the first the *Yasa* or *Yasak*, the Turkish tribal tradition, and the second the *Sheriat*, the sacred law of Islam. The derivation of the first is traced in part to Shamanism and Manicheism, creeds which saw religion and the State as separate worlds, and this broadly is the nomad's faith. The second, the sacred law, inspired the ancient culture of Khorasan which overflowed into Transoxiana. It does not distinguish religion from politics and in practice, in its Sunni form, it exalts the priesthood. In the *medreses* of Samarkand, Bukhara and Balkh it prevailed, taking advantage of Turkish *laisser-faire*. But the torch of the older custom remained alight among the nomads.

While the modern nationalists[1] cannot sufficiently condemn the clerics — the picture is familiar — they are constrained to admit, with a deep sense of emotion, that Islam lives on in the hearts of the people, far beyond the precincts of the mosque. As a Kazak said in Mecca: 'Since we have no mosques, no official clergy, and no institution that the Communists can abuse, this means that they can do nothing with us'. It may be that the whole of Turkistan will come to Islam in this sense. Again, early in August 1922, the Bolsheviks commissioned a party of influential clergy to demand

[1] For Togan's exposition see *op. cit.* pp. 530-35, of which these paragraphs are in some sense a distillation.

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771 of the Basmachis that they submit to the Soviets. The Basmachi Achil Beg, addressing them, said: 'Let us leave the Bolsheviks on one side for the moment, and also those who speak for them. Come, tell me, on your conscience, whether God will be pleased by your attitude or no?' Said the priests, 'Sir, you know that better than we do.' Whereupon Achil Beg cried with a loud voice, 'You fools! If it is I that know God's will, why preach you in the name of God? Have you no shame to come to us today preaching for the Russians? I would kill you all, but that you are old and foolish and soon will die. Go, and God's curse be with you!' And the Basmachis applauded.

The conclusion is that, under Bolshevist pressure, religious institutions have for ever lost their old meaning and force in Turkistan, partly because the priesthood failed to stand to their brief, but more because religious endowments had been seized and the clergy's authority undermined. 'Yet Islam, cleansed of its theocratic accretions, lives as a spiritual possession in the hearts of the people. Unlike the Orthodox Church of Russia, it does not meet the Godlessness of Communism in an opportune spirit, but is becoming more and more unified with the traditions in our inmost hearts. It is the time of the peoples' clergy.' In fact, Islam has become the spiritual core of the nationalist political creed.

771 626 Current evidence from Russian sources goes to support the conclusion. The contemporary press harps on the defects of Islam, the prejudices of the clergy and the identification of Muslim ideas with a feudal patriarchal framework. Other themes constantly expressed are indignation over loss of time due to religious observances or prayer; persistence of religious influences even among Party members, preference for the Koran over medical attention or drugs; even the stupid story of the Comsomol member with his charm.

The spear-head of the Soviet drive against the faith of Muhammad is supposed to be the Comsomol organizations. The secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazak Com-

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munist Party, Shayakhmetov,[1] went on the air just before Christmas 1951, with a direction to the Comsomols in Kazakistan to take an active part in the struggle against religious behaviour or feudal survivals, and to unmask the *advances* made by people of that way of thought. Whenever work on these lines slackened, he said, there emerged insubordination among individual Comsomols, bourgeois-nationalistic tendencies, and, worst of all, religion among the youth. Not for the first time those who worship Divus Augustus have found that there is no challenge to a living faith which goes without its response. Deviationism will remain for the Soviets an ever-present problem.

For the spiritual inheritance of a people, or group of peoples, is not identifiable only with the direct inspirations of a revealed religion. There is a certain afflatus of the Turkish spirit which seems to make the Turk, Western or Eastern, conscious of impulses which in his own estimation move him apart from other men. These have enabled him in the course of time to impress his personality, and even his language, on many who were not Turks, while he preserved his identity proudly for himself. That pride has lasted to this day, and the Turk, whose spirit has breathed over Persian and Mongol, Anatolian and Byzantine, Bashkurd and Kirghiz, remains simply and invincibly himself, curiously unsullied by the more complex influences around him. Many have been turcized; the Turk remains — a prince of deviationists.

It is even a question how far the much-lauded emancipation of women has really weakened the more vital of the Turkish traditions, though it may have transformed them. On the steppe women were never secluded. A vivid nationalism is not seldom nurtured by women, both within and without the home, more feelingly than by fathers or by schoolmen. A greater permeation of society by women may produce a higher feminine velocity, as it were, and in the end recoil on the

[1] It is not easy to recognize in Russian garb the Muslim name Shah Ahmed. Moreover, the habit of using the patronymic results in the world never knowing a man's own name. Although this is in tune with the use of the Turkish termination *-oghlu*, it is a break away from Muslim custom.

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them through heredity and upbringing, and a torch of that kind will be extinguished if there are not those who come to trim it or to supply fresh fuel to keep it alight. We have to determine from their history how far the inspirations of the Eastern Turks are strong enough to survive the immense pressures set in force to muffle them.

In the course of this survey we have noticed more than once the strength and weakness of the spiritual possessions of the various societies which have gone to make up the amalgam of peoples in Turkistan. We found two main strands of thought, that of the cities, and that of the steppe. After the impulses of expansion were spent with the end of the caravan age, the cities of Central Asia, cut off from any fertilizing stream, relapsed into a jealous medievalism, a bigotry proverbial even in an age and region where tolerance was not in fashion. Fertile enough to maintain themselves in self-sufficiency, with a respectable margin for these same leaders of bigotry, they refused or denied all outside influences which might have checked the negations of their narrow clericalism. The peculiar brand of scholastic religion associated with the Central Asian *medreses* may have been as persistent as other Islamic manifestations, but it had become derelict and ossified. It was a strange mingling of the barren controversies of the schoolman with the emotional hysteria of the dervish, and it is not irreverent to find in the fanatical rigidity of the *emirs* and *ulema* of Bukhara and Khiva the very prototype of that Communist faith which in its turn was to admit no deviation and preach its own anathema. Even the religious mania of the dervish and the assassin has in it some quality which by a strange paradox is akin to the missionary endeavours of the high priests of Communism. Intolerance, bigotry, blood-purges, are common to all forms of fanaticism; they are the outward showing of the spiritual condition which prompts the fanatic — hatred and fear. All religions, Islam not excepted, have been guilty of aberrations such as these. It was this attitude more than anything else which, for the three centuries between the fall of the Timurids and the coming of

The population of the former[1] was traditionally nomadic, Turkish, and in religious matters fairly indifferent. Turkestan, on the other hand, being predominantly urban and agricultural, and inhabited by Iranians and considerably Arabicized and Iranicized Turks, was until the Soviet period one of the great centers of Islamic learning and practice. This difference between the religious background of the two regions must be kept in mind when studying contemporary Central Asian Muslims. 101 771

The most striking feature of the religious attitude of the Muslim refugees is their strong and articulate hostility toward all forms of established religion, including Islam. Time and again, the informants expressed the conviction that all religion is a form of superstition incapable of standing the test of "science," of serving society as a means of attaining social progress. The typical opinion ran as follows: "Yes, I believe in a Supreme Being, but it doesn't matter whether He is called Allah, God, Christ, or anything else. Nor does He care whether I pray or not. Religion is a superstition which keeps people backward. Look at the Arabs and Persians, where religion has gotten them: they are poor and ignorant. To achieve progress, we must not allow religion to interfere, though religion should not be persecuted because it does help some people in facing life." The general assumptions behind such reasoning are fairly obvious: the belief in a conflict between faith and reason, religion and science; a pragmatic, utilitarian scale of values; scepticism of certain aspects of religion, leading to a wholesale rejection of all religion. 115 771

In the long run, this attitude may well determine the whole future of Islam in Central Asia. The intelligentsia displays the same cult of reason, and of its concomitant, secular society, in an extreme, uncomprising way, as do the educated groups of other Asian societies. Here, as there, progress, the ultimate good, is conceived as incompatible with religion. Against such hostility to established religion the revival of Islam in its pre-1917 form, even under conditions of complete freedom, does not seem likely. 517 771

This conclusion is strengthened by the picture given of the religious practices of Central Asian Muslims. Islam in the Soviet Union has to operate under extremely difficult conditions, due in part to the specific repressive measures undertaken by the regime against religion, and in part to the general conditions of Soviet life. In the first category are the physical destruction of the Islamic leadership undertaken between 1927 and 1932 through the arrest and deportation of virtually all persons enjoying some religious status in the Muslim community, from the top hierarchy to the lowest village mullah; the closing of nearly all the village mosques and most of the city mosques; the threat of dismissal hanging constantly over every Soviet citizen in any position of responsibility if known to engage in religious practices; and the nearly complete suppression of all religious literature through the change of the native alphabets (from Arabic to 798 212

[1] [the northern half of Soviet Central Asia or Kazakhstan -- Analyst]

585 Occasionally, refugees indicate, after
177 a formal lay wedding ceremony, the parents of the bride and bridegroom may engage the services of a mullah or another trained person to read in secret the *nikah*, the wedding formula, but this is an exception rather than the rule.

798 As for the *shari'ah* — representing for the Muslims the religious "way
517 of life" — it has been eliminated not only by the Soviet liquidation of
177 native religious courts and the introduction of a single system of justice
578 throughout the Soviet Union, but also by the spontaneous development of Muslim society itself. Even prior to the 1917 Revolution there had emerged among the Central Asian intelligentsia a powerful secular reform movement known as *jadidism* (*dzhadidism*, in Russian transliteration), the followers of which adopted as one of their principal aims the separation of religion and state. The jadidists fought the clerical groups, gathered around the Ulema Dzhemieti (Association of Ulema), with as much fervor as they fought Russian colonial officials and settlers. Indeed, on this basis of a united effort against the religious influence on everyday life, there occurred in the early period of the Soviet regime an alliance between the Communists and left-wing jadidists which lasted until the purges of the 1930's. The desire to transform Central Asia into a modern, secular, Western country — a desire which is as deep-seated in the post-World War II refugee as it was in the pre-1917 jadidist — has as one of its prerequisites the elimination of religion from a position of influence in the everyday life of the Muslim community, and its confinement to the "proper" sphere, that is, ritual. Islam as a way of life has thus been destroyed by the combined pressures of Soviet antireligious policy and the hostility of the native intelligentsia. The trend in the direction of secularization is so distinct as to make a return to the *shari'ah* as unlikely as a return of Western Europe to the medieval theocratic ideal.[3]

771 Without doubt the religious life of the Islamic community in Central
565 Asia is stronger among the lower strata of society, among the mountain
517 peoples, and among the elders and women than it is among the groups represented in the interviews. But it is equally certain that the most active elements of society — the adult males, and especially the rural and urban "intelligentsia" — reject religion. A certain measure of religious revival in the event of the return of civic freedom in Central Asia is not unlikely. It may lead to a reopening of the mosques, the reinstitution of Friday prayers, the emergence of mullahs and the introduction of some religious education for the young. But a return to the religious life of the pre-
795 1927–32 period seems entirely out of the question. Islam still survives as
177 a powerful social bond because it serves to differentiate the native from

[3] In this connection it is interesting to note that recently a Constitutional Commission of Pakistan declared that a republic based on the principles of the Qur'an, as desired by the Pakistani ulema, could not be a democratic one, because of the fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy. See *New York Times*, April 24, 1954.

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
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[Baluchi]

two forms. More revealing is the fact that Stalin's speeches are printed in Baluchi by the State Publishing House of Ashkhabad, presumably for 'export purposes'. S.U. 563 648 Tu. 563

## AN ARAB 'BIROBIDZHAN'?

The politically interesting minorities in Soviet Central Asia also include the Arabs, although the Soviet régime has been unable to exploit them as an instrument of its power politics.

The question to what end the 20,000 Arabs in Uzbekistan could best be used was carefully studied by Soviet Orientalists.[61] Eventually, they arrived at the conclusion that it was impossible to create an 'Arab Birobidzhan' in the Soviet Union, and, with considerable regret, gave up such a scheme and the great propaganda potentialities within it. They believed that nothing could be done for the cultural development of the Arabs in Uzbekistan, who are split into two groups, one inhabiting the Kashka Darya Province and the other living near Bokhara. The dialects of the two Arab groups differ so widely that understanding between them is possible only through the medium of the Uzbek language.

With few exceptions all Soviet Arabs speak either Uzbek or Tadzhik in addition to their own Arab dialect and it can be found frequently that people who describe themselves as 'Arabs' have no longer any notion of the language of their forefathers. The Soviet régime did not attempt to hold up this process of assimilation and Arab children are educated in either Uzbek or Tadzhik schools. Tu. [91]

The Arab dialects spoken in villages near Bokhara and Samarkand are as incomprehensible to the Arabs of Baghdad or Damascus as a foreign language. They have thus no export value, and the Soviet Government considered, therefore, that no useful purpose could be served by printing political literature in 'Central Asian Arabic'.

* * *

Two important conclusions are to be drawn from the situation in Soviet Central Asia. The first is that religious and political ideas opposed to Bolshevism have not yet been exterminated even if all organized anti-Soviet movements have been destroyed. Political ideas hostile to Bolshevism emerge time and again among the staffs of official Soviet institutions, universities, academies, publishing houses; they make themselves felt in the Union of Soviet Writers and even in the local branches of the Communist Party; they appear in novels, poems and scientific works. Tu. 668 S.U. 563 668

Islam is still unvanquished in Central Asia, not only as an idea but even as an organization, the only organization which covers the whole of Central Asia, with Tashkent as the natural centre. The 'Moslem Tu. 668 659 771

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Turkestan RL1



Ecclesiastical Administration of Central Asia and Kazakhstan' is no Islamic fighting organization; on the contrary, it is forced to serve the Soviet régime. None the less, the fact that the régime saw itself compelled to tolerate the 'ecclesiastical administration' amounts to an official admission testifying to the tenacity of Mohammedan faith. Indeed, even faithful disciples of the Koran acquire Communist Party membership tickets, and sabotage the anti-religious policy from within, though only in small ways. The spiritual fight between Islam and Bolshevism goes on, particularly in the rural and mountain regions of Soviet Central Asia. The Soviet Government conducts the fight with the help of anti-religious films, lectures and museums; the believers by sticking to their religious customs, however much they may be deprecated by the authorities.

The second conclusion is that the five Central Asiatic Soviet Republics can never become fully emancipated colonial territories because a few decades of Russian rule have succeeded in injecting them with a strong Russian ethnical element. The Russians dominate the towns of Central Asia and its industrial centres, they also constitute in many areas the most advanced section of the rural population. They are bound to keep important commanding posts in their hands not only because they serve as 'experts' in the absence of native cadres, but also because their numerical strength will always entitle them to be considered in the allocation of governmental jobs in industry and administration.

The emancipation of the peoples of India and Burma was considerably more far-reaching than that granted by the Soviet Government to the Central Asiatic peoples. When the British Government bestowed a new status on India, Burma and Ceylon, Britain did not 'bequeath' to the countries an English minority entitled to parliamentary seats and government posts and intended to assume an important or even a leading role in the economic life of the countries concerned. Unlike the British, who really left India, the Russians stayed in Central Asia.

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